Louisiana Law Review
Volume 45 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1983-1984: A Symposium
November 1984

Professional Responsibility
Warren Mengis

Repository Citation
Warren Mengis, Professional Responsibility, 45 La. L. Rev. (1984)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol45/iss2/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Warren Mengis *

The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised,
within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client
and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his
personal interest, the interest of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his
client.'
The focus of this ethical consideration is on the client, whether a
present client or a former client. If it is a present client, vigorous
representation should not be diluted by any self-interest of the attorney,
any interest of other present clients, interest of former clients, or influence by anyone else. If a former client, confidences and secrets gained
in the prior representation should not be disclosed nor used in such a
way as to prejudice that client.
Perhaps because of the present mobility of lawyers and the escalating
size of law firms, both state and federal courts are being confronted
with many motions to disqualify attorneys. These motions may be based
on direct prejudice to a present or former client of the attorneys sought
to be disqualified, or based on an appearance of impropriety, though
no actual prejudice exists. As pointed out by Judge Tate in Brasseaux
v. Girouard:
Reasons assigned for the fairly strict disqualification principle
followed by all American jurisdictions in which the issue has
arisen, have included its necessity in order to encourage maximum disclosure by clients to counsel of all relevant facts, without
fear of future adverse use of this confidence. The courts also
express as rationale that public confidence in the legal profession
as a whole might otherwise be impaired. For these reasons of
public policy, the general rule is that doubts in borderline cases
should be resolved in favor of disqualification, with the important injunction being reiterated that, for these reasons, even
the appearance of conflict should be avoided.2
Copyright 1985 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Code of Prof. Resp. EC 5-1 (found in Articles of Incorp., La. State Bar
Ass'n art. XVI; La. R.S. tit. 37, ch. 4, app. (1974)) [hereinafter cited as Code of Prof.
Resp.1.
2. 214 So. 2d 401, 406 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 253 La. 60, 216 So. 2d
307 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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Where a Canon 4 (confidences and secrets) or a Canon 5 (independent professional judgment) conflict is present, the harmful effects
of a disqualification are outweighed by the interest of another client or
a former client. These adverse interests include the present client's right
to counsel of choice, the impingement of judicial economy through time
lost, and additional costs to the client. On the other hand, where there
is no substance to a Canon 4 or Canon 5 violation, but where there
might be an appearance of impropriety, which Canon 9 counsels against,
it appears that at least some courts are holding that the disadvantages
of disqualification outweigh the broad application of Canon 9, particularly where the disqualification might extend to an entire law firm.3
As we shall see, Louisiana courts have also had to deal with several
conflict situations.
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

In civil cases, the courts of appeal were confronted with two motions
to disqualify based on Canon 5 and particularly the provisions of Disciplinary Rules 5-101 and 5-102 (DR's) which generally enjoin a lawyer
from accepting employment or continuing employment when it is obvious
that he should be a witness on behalf of his client. Additionally one
motion to disqualify was based on the provisions of Canon 4 and
successive representation.
We look first to Exnicios v. Saunders,4 a matter before the fourth
circuit on plaintiff's application for writs because of the trial court's
disqualification of plaintiff's attorney. Defendants who filed the motion
to disqualify asserted that the testimony of plaintiff's lawyer was crucial
to plaintiff's case and that his lawyer "ought to be called as a witness,"
and therefore, withdrawal was mandated by the provisions of DR 5102. Plaintiff, however, contended that the exceptions set forth under
DR 5-101(B) applied, particularly exceptions 1 and 2, which relate to
uncontested matters and mere formalities. Plaintiff also contended that
a disqualification would work a substantial hardship on him because of
the distinctive value of the lawyer, and that this brought the matter
squarely under the fourth exception to DR 5-101(B). Defendants then
exerted some pressure by announcing that they intended to sequester
plaintiff's attorney along with all other witnesses under article 1631 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The situation presents one of the many
conflicts between ethical rules and procedural rules. Even if the fourth
exception were applicable and plaintiff's attorney would be violating no
ethical rule, defendant still had an absolute right to sequester plaintiff's
attorney-effectively preventing him from participating in the trial.
3.

Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Sierra

Vista Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 639 F.2d 749 (Ct. C1. 1981); Kesselhaut v. United
States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. C1. 1977).
4. 448 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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Citing language from Gutierrez v. Travelers Insurance Co.,' the
court of appeal refused the writ, thereby maintaining the disqualification.
The court placed great reliance upon the trial court's discretion and
knowledge of the situation and on the general ethical rule that a witness
should provide the court with objective truth and should not place
himself in a position to champion his own credibility.
Deer Slayers, Inc. v. Louisiana Motel and Investment Corp.6 was
an after-the-fact situation in which plaintiff's attorney had already testified on behalf of his client in a rule for a preliminary injunction. The
matter was on appeal from that interlocutory judgment. The trial court
had refused to disqualify plaintiff's attorney even though he was a
witness in the case. Defendants, relying heavily on Gutierrez, contended
that by permitting plaintiff's attorney to testify on a material matter in
violation of DR 5-101 and 102, the trial court committed reversible
error. On appeal the majority, although expressing disapproval of the
lawyer's representation of the plaintiff, held that the admission of the
attorney's testimony did not by itself warrant the sanction of reversal
and a new trial. "Reversal is not warranted because the 'code [of
Professional Responsibility] does not delineate rules of evidence but only
sets forth strictures on attorney conduct.' ' 7 The court concluded that
the refusal to disqualify the attorney was harmless error and that it
found no prejudice to defendant. Judge Cole dissented, concluding that
the trial court, knowing before trial of the importance of the testimony
of plaintiff's attorney, should have disqualified him. This would have
prevented the ethical violation and also would have protected the public's
confidence in the legal profession. He concluded that the social need
for ethical practice outweighs the party's right to counsel of his choice.
The writer sees the majority opinion as a retreat from the holdings
of Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products8 and Leenerts Farms' Inc. v. Rogers.9
Readers will recall that Saucier characterized the Code of Professional
Responsibility as having the force and effect of substantive law and
Leenerts described it as the most exacting of laws established for the
public good.
Darby v. Methodist Hospital'0 produced another strong dissent, this
time from Chief Judge Redmann of the fourth circuit. The defendants
sought to have plaintiff's counsel removed because his law partner
represented the defendant in a prior medical malpractice suit. The question, according to the majority, was whether the information obtained
5. 358 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
6. 434 So. 2d 1183 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 151 (La. 1983).
7. 434 So. 2d at 1187 (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, 546
F.2d 530, 539 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977)).
8. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1979) (on reh'g).
9. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982), superseded by La. Civ. Code art. 1935, as amended
by 1983 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 483, § 1.
10. 447 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 448 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1984).
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from the doctor in the earlier case was substantially related to the instant
case. Finding that it was not, the application for supervisory writs was
denied. Judge Redmann quoted extensively from T.C. Theater Corp. v.
Warner Brothers Pictures," perhaps the leading case on successive representation and the Canon 4 ethical conflict presented. It is generally
presumed that confidences and secrets received by one partner in a law
firm are received by all partners in that firm. 12 Whether this presumption
is rebuttable is hotly debated where very large firms are involved, but
with small law firms the presumption is usually considered irrebuttable.' 3
In the instant case Judge Redmann cited DR 5-105(D) as authority for
disqualifying all lawyers associated with the "infected" lawyer. However,
Louisiana's DR 5-105(D) presumably does not extend to Canon 4 disqualifications or Canon 9 disqualifications since the 1974 amendment
to the ABA DR 5-105(D) was not adopted by Louisiana. Judge Redmann
concluded that the two matters were substantially related, that there was
a presumption that confidences and secrets of the client were shared
with the law partner, and therefore, both lawyers in the partnership
would be disqualified. If there is any doubt about these conclusions,
said Judge Redmann, Canon 9's injunction to avoid even the appearance
of professional impropriety should resolve the doubt in favor of disqualification.
As to criminal cases the supreme court dealt with three cases involving possible conflicts of interests in multiple representation: The
6
5
cases are: State v. Edwards,'4 State v. Kahey,' and State v. Morrow.
As pointed out in these cases, multiple representation is not by itself
illegal and does not violate either the Sixth Amendment or article 1
section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution unless it gives rise to a conflict
of interest. In other words, there must be an actual conflict of interest
adversely affecting the lawyer's performance. Where such a conflict of
interest exists, the prejudice may be subtle, even unconscious, and may
elude detection on review. Accordingly, where the conflict is real, a
claim of denial of effective representation may be made without a
showing of specific prejudice.
In State v. Morrow, the most recent of the three cases, the relator
sought post-conviction relief on the ground that a plausible defense
helpful to him, but possibly prejudicial to a co-defendant, was not

11. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.), reh'g denied, 125 F. Supp. 233 (1953).
12. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Novo
Teraputisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1979) (on reh'g en banc).
13. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
14. 430 So. 2d 60 (La. 1983).
15. 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983).
16. 440 So. 2d 98 (La. 1983).
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advanced by relator's attorney. Finding that another plausible defense
did exist that could not be presented because of an actual conflict of
interest, the court set aside the relator's conviction and remanded the
matter to the district court for a new trial. Justice Lemmon, who
authored the court's opinion, suggested in a footnote that in every case
of multiple representation trial courts should inquire into potential conflicts and inform the accused, on the record, of the possible dangers.
Justice Lemmon also stated that, for ethical reasons, defense attorneys
should ordinarily decline to represent more than one of several codefendants, unless a careful investigation reveals that there is no likely
conflict, and that the co-defendants have consented, on the record and
7
after full disclosure, to the multiple representation.1
Another criminal case, State v. Costillo,8 involved an "out-of-time"
criminal appeal granted by the district court on an application for postconviction relief. In one assignment of error, the defendant alleged denial
of effective assistance of counsel on the ground that his court-appointed
counsel was the husband of the assistant district attorney who prosecuted
him. Although the last name of the two attorneys was the same, the
evidence in the record did not show that they were married, so the
matter was remanded to the trial court for the introduction of more
evidence. The Professional Responsibility Committee for the Louisiana
State Bar Association considered a similar question in its opinion number
346.19 One of the questions submitted to the committee was: may spouses
personally represent or assist in the representation of opposing parties
in a legal matter (either civil or criminal)? The answer was an emphatic
no, based on Canons 4, 5 and 9.
ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL

The many courts which have been concerned with defining "effective
assistance of counsel" were understandably disappointed with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cronic,20
decided in May of 1984. The Tenth Circuit 2' had set up a five criteria
test which considered (I) the time afforded for investigation and preparation, (2) the experience of counsel, (3) the gravity of the charge, (4)
the complexity of possible defenses, and (5) the accessibility of witnesses
to counsel. The Supreme Court said that the use of this test, without
more, was wrong because it would require reversal even if the lawyer's
actual performance was flawless. 22 The Court stated that effective assistance of counsel should not be recognized for its own sake, but
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

440 So. 2d at 103 n.7.
448 So. 2d 238 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
Louisiana State Bar Association, Attorney's Desk Book 0-138.
104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2043.
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23
because of its effect on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.
The five factors listed by the court of appeal are relevant to an evaluation
of a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case, but neither separately
nor in combination do they provide a basis for concluding that competent
counsel was not able to provide the particular accused with the guiding
hand that the constitution guarantees. 24 Since the court of appeal had
only passed on the overall performance of the attorney and had not
discussed or ruled on the specific errors, the case was remanded to the
court of appeal for further consideration. Cronic added nothing concrete
to the Supreme Court's decision in McMann v. Richardson5 in which
the Court held that the right to counsel is the right to "effective
assistance of counsel."
In Louisiana, effective assistance was again considered in State ex
rel. Graffagnino v. King26 in which the court, adhering to former pronouncements, held that effective assistance of counsel does not mean
errorless counsel or counsel which may be judged ineffective on mere
hindsight, but rather counsel reasonably likely to render, and actually
rendering, reasonably effective assistance. The court also reaffirmed the
two-pronged inquiry enunciated in State v. Berry,27 taken by the court
from McQueen v. Swenson. 2 Under the inquiry, the court must first
ascertain whether counsel violated some duty to the client and if so,
whether this violation prejudiced the client in the defense of his case.
This test is consistent with the rationale of United States v. Cronic. In
other words, inferential error is not sufficient, but failure to assist the
29
client or to present a defense is reversible error.
In State v. Maggio3 ° and State v. Lowenfield,3' the courts plainly
indicated that an indigent's right to counsel is not absolute and cannot
be manipulated to obstruct orderly procedures which would thwart the
administration of justice nor can an indigent seek to change courtappointed attorneys unless he can produce sound reasons for the disqualification of the first attorney.
Apparently the Department of Health and Human Resources has
decided not to consider the decision in In re Lamm3 2 a final pronouncement that it must pay the attorney fee of an attorney assigned to
represent the child in an abandonment proceeding. To the contrary, it

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 2046.
Id. at 2049.
397 U.S. 759, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970).
436 So. 2d 559 (La. 1983).
430 So. 2d 1005 (La. 1983).
498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
State v. Brooks, 452 So. 2d 149 (La. 1984).
449 So. 2d 547 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 450 So. 2d 354 (La. 1984).
450 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
In re Lamm, 423 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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successfully argued in State in the Interest of Dillard3 that such a fee
should fall under the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:144149 creating and funding Judicial District Indigent Defendant Boards
and that an attorney so appointed to represent an abandoned child
should apply for fees to that particular Indigent Defendant Board. The
court further held that Article 95 of the Code of Juvenile Procedure,
and in particular subsection B thereof, does not apply in an abandonment
4
proceeding.
MALPRACTICE

The Louisiana Supreme Court, by a four to three vote, denied a
writ application in Wingate v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,15
thereby declining an opportunity to clear up the conflict in the circuit
courts concerning prescription of a malpractice action against an attorney. The first circuit had clarified the conflict in its own jurisdiction
by its decision in Cherokee Restaurant Inc. v. Pierson,36 in which the
court held that the normal malpractice action against an attorney is a
tort action prescribed by one year and that only when an attorney
breaches an express warranty of result does an action of breach of
contract arise, in which case a ten year prescriptive period should be
applied. The third circuit, however, disagreed with this approach in
Wingate,3 7 holding that a malpractice action could state a claim both
in tort and in contract, and consequently, the longer prescriptive period
would apply. In a footnote, the court noted and disagreed with the
first circuit's decision. The second and fourth circuits, however, have
both adopted the Cherokee Restaurant approach. 8 It seems to the writer
that ten years is an inordinate amount of time within which to bring
a malpractice action against an attorney, and no sound reason exists
for applyirig such a lengthy prescriptive period.
In 1982 the writer reviewed Boyette v. Auger Timber Co., 9 in which
one of the plaintiffs was met with a third party demand and suddenly
found himself with two lawyers, one which he had retained for the
principal suit and one which the insurer furnished for the third party
demand. The insurance company's attorney took a position contrary to
the position taken by plaintiff and the majority of the court of appeal
33. 450 So. 2d 977 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
34. See also State in the Interest of a Minor, 446 So. 2d 1385 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984).
35. 440 So. 2d 762 (La. 1983).
36. 428 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431 So. 2d 773 (La. 1983).
37. 435 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 762 (La. 1983).
38. Knighten v. Knighten, 447 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Sturm v. Zelden
& Zelden, 445 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
39. 403 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), discussed in Mengis, Developments in
the Law, 1981-1982-Professional Responsibility, 43 La. L. Rev. 555, 557 (1982).
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found that (1) the position taken by the insurance company's counsel
was highly prejudicial to the plaintiff and (2) the trial should not have
been allowed to proceed. Lowe v. Continental Insurance Co.,40 a sequel
to Boyette was essentially a malpractice action against the insurance
company's attorney. Unfortunately for Mr. Lowe, however, he had to
show that, but for the prejudice caused by his insurance company
lawyer's taking a position contrary to his retained lawyer's position, he
would have won a judgment. Judge Marvin, writing for the court, took
cognizance of Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. 41 and
imposed on the defendants the burden of overcoming the plaintiff's
prima facie case by showing that the plaintiff could not have succeeded
notwithstanding the impropriety. When the second circuit initially reviewed Boyette it completely disregarded the jury verdict in favor of
the defendants, reviewed all of the evidence, and found that the plaintiffs
had in fact received a fair trial and that the evidence preponderated in
favor of the defendants. In the instant case, Judge Marvin stated that
the court had again reviewed Boyette in the light most favorable toward
the present plaintiff and again found that the sole fault of the Boyette
accident rested with Lowe (the plaintiff in this malpractice action) and
that, therefore, he was not entitled to any recovery even though there
had been an impropriety. As an epilogue the court said:
The Code of Professional Responsibility has the force and
effect of substantive law. . . . The disciplinary rules are mandatory. If each member of the profession, lawyer or judge,
recognizes his or her obligation to maintain competency in this
area of the law for the good of the client and the profession,
42
disputes of this sort will, as they should, be avoided.
Occasionally even competent and diligent attorneys will give advice
which is patently and obviously wrong even to a lay person. Whether
we blame this on gremlins, an attack of senility, or stenographic error,
we know that it does happen. Any lawyer who questions the advisibility
of carrying professional liability insurance should read SpeeDee Oil
Change No. 2, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 43 in which
the attorney had advised in writing that an option to extend a lease
could be exercised 31 days after the termination of the lease. He gave
this advice to a vice president of the lessee corporation who, relying
on the attorney's advice, did not attempt to renew until after the lease
had expired. The court was of the opinion that a person of ordinary

40. 437 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert, denied, 442 So. 2d 460 (La. 1983), 104
S. Ct. 1924 (1984).
41. 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982).
42. 437 So. 2d at 930 (citation omitted).
43. 444 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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common sense would not have to read a lease to know that once a
lease has expired, its expiration can no longer be prevented and, therefore, when the vice president received the mistaken advice from the
attorney, he should have recognized the error. However, the court refused
to impute the vice president's negligence to the corporation and permitted
recovery against the attorney's insurer in the sum of $50,800 (the difference between the rent if the option had been timely exercised and
the rent which the corporation was now forced to pay). The vice president
was not a party to the law suit and, therefore, the question of contribution from him could not be adjudicated.
Failure to read a loan commitment resulted in a $237,200 judgment
against an attorney in Meyers v. Imperial Casualty Indemnity Co."4 The
commitment specified a closing date of no later than October 31, 1980
and set two deadlines in connection with that date. First, ninety days
in advance of the closing date, the borrower had to submit a formal
notice of his intention to execute the commitment. Second, forty-five
days in advance of the closing date, the borrower had to deliver the
required mortgage documentation. The borrower met the first deadline
but missed the second. The attorney attempted to show that the borrower
was also negligent in failing to gather necessary information, but the
court held that a client is entitled to rely on the expertise and diligence
of his attorney. The court reiterated the standard of negligence in a
legal malpractice case: "[an attorney is obligated to exercise at least
that degree of skill and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing
'4
attorneys in his locality."
ATTORNEY'S FEES

In this forum last year 46 the writer gave considerable space to decisions involving attorney's fees. Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers47 had
been decided recently and considerable speculation existed among lawyers
concerning the continued viability of attorney fee stipulations in promissory notes. In addition, the legislature amended Civil Code Article
1935 in an apparent attempt to overrule Leenerts. 8 In essence, the
Leenerts court held that the courts always have the right to reduce an
attorney fee which is unreasonably high. In Knighten v. Knighten49 the
court held that it might inquire into the reasonableness of an attorney
fee even if no issue as to the fee was raised by the opposing party

44.
45.
46.
L. Rev.
47.
48.
49.

451 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
451 So. 2d at 653.
Mengis, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Professional Responsibility, 44 La.
489 (1983).
421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
1983 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 483.
447 So. 2d 534 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
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because this is a matter of public policy.50 Further, if the matter comes
up on confirmation of default and the record does not reflect whether
the trial court inquired into the reasonableness of the fee, the appellate
court will remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine the
amount of attorney fees to be awarded to the plaintiff.5' That the
confirmation and the attorney fee were based upon a stipulation in the
promissory note presumably agreed upon between the parties will not
prevent the remand where the fee appears to be excessive in view of
the routine nature of the proceeding. In City Bank and Trust Co. v.
Hardage Corp.5 2 the defendant maker of the note which bore a twentyfive per cent attorney's fee provision appealed solely on the basis that
the default judgment was entered against it without sufficient proof of
the adequacy or excessiveness of the fee (so far the writer has not seen
any case where the fee was increased in a promissory note situation).
The appellate court, instead of remanding, reviewed the record and
determined that a $1500 fee, instead of the $12,500 fee stipulated by
the note, would be reasonable. The court stated that while the general
rule is that the trial court is in the better position to determine what
is a reasonable fee under the facts of a particular case, appellate courts
can and should set the fees when the record reflects a basis therefore.
Banks v. Pearson 3 presented somewhat different facts. Here the attorney
had consummated a loan closing and at the finale he had handed the
buyer a bill for $5,000 which the buyer paid by issuing his check.
However, immediately after leaving the closing, he stopped payment on
the check, which led to this lawsuit by the attorney. The trial court
found that the buyer issued the check simply to avoid a public dispute,
that there had never been a meeting of the minds between the attorney
and the buyer concerning the fee and, therefore, no contract existed.
However, on the basis of unjust enrichment the trial court set a $1500
fee and rendered judgment subsequently affirmed on appeal. We shall
have to wait and see what the courts will do with the amendment to
article 1935 of the Civil Code. If constitutional, will the amendment
apply only to promissory notes executed after the date of the amendment
or will it simply put the law back where it was prior to the supreme
court decision in Leenerts? At least one case is pending in the First
Circuit Court of Appeal where these issues are being presented.14 Another
consideration is the effect of the obligations revision which became
50.
2d Cir.
51.
1984).
52.
53.
54.
1984).
55.

See also City of Shreveport v. Standard Printing Co., 427 So. 2d 1304 (La. App.
1983).
Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Eskan, 450 So. 2d 767 (La. App. 5th Cir.
449 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
446 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
Graham v. Seqoia Corp., No. CA 84-0336 (La. App. 1st Cir., filed March 16,
1984 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 331.
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effective on January 1, 1985. Old article 1935 is replaced by new article
20006 which does not contain the language added to article 1935 by
the 1983 amendment. New articles 200517 and 201258 should also be read
carefully.
Farrarv. Kelly,5 9 presents what is a wholly predictable result of the
Leenerts decision. Once the work is done, the client may have a different
appreciation of the attorney's worth and may wish to renegotiate his
fee. If the lawyer refuses, the client may simply resort to the court,
asserting that the fee is excessive. At the time the attorney in Farrar
took the case, the client was seeking to be recognized as an illegitimate
child of his father and to recover his part of his father's succession.
6
This was prior to the supreme court decision in Succession of Brown. 0
Obviously the attorney's task was made much easier by Succession of
Brown, but the attorney nevertheless performed substantial services on
the client's behalf with a completely successful result. The court found
that under the circumstances a 50-percent contingent fee was not excessive.
However, it is obvious that the attorneys had to earn the fee twice,
once in the initial litigation and once again to collect the fee. This leads
to two cases which opened the door to collecting attorney's fees on
attorney's fees.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2781, which provides for an award of
"reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection with the successful
prosecution of a suit on open account," was amended by Act 463 of
1981 to provide that an "open account" shall include debts incurred
for professional services, including, but not limited to, legal and medical
services which are rendered on a continuing basis. Whether the matter
in Farrarwould have qualified as an open account is doubtful, to say
the least, but in Metropolis, Inc. v. Hanson,61 the attorney was permitted
to recover attorney fees on an "open account" for legal services involving
a divorce suit and a suit to rescind a community property settlement.
56. When the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages for delay
in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from the time it is
due, at the rate 'agreed by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, at the
legal rate in effect at the time it is due. The obligee may recover these damages
without having to prove any loss.
La. Civ. Code art. 2000 (enacted by. 1984 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 331, § 1).
57. Parties may stipulate the damages to be recovered in case of nonperformance,
defective performance, or delay in performance of an obligation.
That stipulation gives rise to a secondary obligation for the purpose of
enforcing the principal one.
La. Civ. Code art. 2005 (enacted by 1984 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 331, § 1).
58. Stipulated damages may not be modified by the court unless they are so
manifestly unreasonable as to be contrary to public policy.
La. Civ. Code art. 2012 (enacted by 1984 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 331, § I).'
59. 440 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
60. 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir.), aff'd, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
61. 434 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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It is doubtful that services rendered on a one case basis would qualify
as an open account, and one must also be mindful of ethical consideration 2-23 which provides, among other things, that a lawyer should
not sue a client for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross
imposition by the client. 62 In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in Frank L. Beier Radio, Inc. v. Black Gold Marine, Inc., 63 held that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2781 must be construed strictly because the
award of attorney fees is exceptional and penal in nature and that if
there is any difference in the amount billed and the amount found to
be due by the court, attorney fees will not be awarded.
Another predictable result of Leenerts and Saucier& is the attempted
intervention by a discharged attorney to collect his fee. The fourth
circuit, in American General Investment Corp. v. St. Elmo Lands,6 had
decided that an attorney had no right to intervene to protect his fee
stipulated in the promissory note since the stipulation ran in favor of
the holder of the note rather than in favor of the attorney. Leenerts,
which suggests that the right to the attorney fee would run in favor of
the attorney, also suggests that the attorney should have the right to
intervene where he had been discharged after performing at least part
of his services. Van Lieu v. Winn Dixie of Louisiana, Inc.66 does not
hold that an attorney cannot intervene for his fee, but simply holds
that the intervention must be filed only while suit is pending and before
judgment on the main demand. Since the intervention in Van Lieu was
filed for the first time in the appellate court, the intervention was
considered untimely.
The question of whether an attorney who is named to represent the
executor or executrix in a testament has an irrevocable mandate, a legacy
(remunerative donation), or a "real interest" was not decided by the
supreme court in Succession of Boyenga. 67 Due to the peculiar posture
of the case and because the attorney who had been removed but had
been awarded a fee did not appeal, the supreme court only affirmed
the appellate court decision setting aside the attorney fee awarded since
the attorney performed no work and was not entitled to an unearned
fee under the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a very short dissent,
Chief Justice Dixon seemed to believe that the naming of the attorney
amounted to a bequest. Rivet v. Battistellas and its progeny69 are still
alive if somewhat weakened and debilitated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
62.
63.
64.
65.
1981).
66.
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69.
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DISCIPLINE

In spite of the injunction of DR 1-102(A)(4) that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and despite the fact that "manifest dishonesty" appears to lead
the causes for disbarment, 70 a small number of Louisiana lawyers continue to fall into the trap of commingling and misusing client's funds.
During the past year, four lawyers were disbarred for this reason. 7 In
each of these cases the Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that the
misuse of client funds represents the gravest form of professional misconduct and strikes at the heart of the public's confidence in the legal
profession-a confidence which the supreme court is obligated to protect. Minimum or average standards of honesty are not considered
sufficient for the practicing attorney-high standards of honesty have
been erected for those engaged in the legal profession and all members
of the profession are required to take an oath to uphold these ideals
of exemplary conduct. As a class, lawyers are subject to a great deal
of stress, and when financial pressures or personal problems are added,
it is perhaps foreseeable that serious violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility will occur. However, one would ordinarily expect
these violations to fall under Canon 6 where neglect or incompetent
handling of a client's affairs are proscribed.72 No matter what the
pressures, a lawyer who has properly set up his bookkeeping system
and who follows the dictates of DR 9-102(B) should not be seriously
tempted to commingle or misuse his client's funds.
Another growing cause of disbarment is the conviction for a serious
crime. Two cases fell into that category within the past year: Louisiana
State Bar Association v. Brumfield" and Louisiana State Bar Association
v. Paige.74 Mr. Brumfield was convicted in the Western District of
Louisiana for conspiracy to escape and aiding in the attempted escape
of one Garvin Dale White. Mr. Brumfield was initially suspended by
the Louisiana Supreme Court and then, upon the finality of his conviction and after the completion of the disciplinary proceedings, he was
1049, 89 So. 2d 894 (1956); Succession of Bush, 223 La. 1008, 67 So. 2d 573 (1953);
Succession of Rembert, 199 La. 743, 7 So. 2d 40 (1942); Succession of Feitel, 187 La.
596, 175 So. 72 (1937); Succession of Mangle, 452 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984);
Succession of Boyenga, 424 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Roberts v. Christina,
323 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Succession of Zatarain, 138 So. 2d 163 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962); Succession of Martin, 56 So. 2d 176 (La. App. Orl. 1952).
70. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1966).
71. LSBA v. Zeringer, 447 So. 2d 466 (La. 1984); LSBA v. Daye, 443 So. 2d 1107
(La. 1984); LSBA v. Atkins, 440 So. 2d 106 (La. 1983); LSBA v. Powell, 439 So. 2d
415 (La. 1983).
72. LSBA v. Bubert 421 So. 2d 831 (La. 1982); LSBA v. Causey, 393 So. 2d 88
(La. 1980).
73. 449 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1984).
74. 456 So. 2d 990 (La. 1984).
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disbarred. The supreme court found that conspiracy to assist in and
aiding in the escape of the prisoner is no less serious a crime than
others for which the court has found disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty. Such convictions include mail fraud, conspiracy to import cocaine, burglary involving theft of property bonds, subordination of a
witness, felony theft, and participation in mail fraud conspiracy. In
Paige'5 the attorney entered a plea of nolo contendere in federal court
to a charge of willfully and knowingly embezzling and misapplying the
sum of $7,000. After the conviction became final, the Committee on
Professional Responsibility filed the usual petition pursuant to article
15, section 8, paragraph 7. The court refused to consider the excuse
that the attorney's secretary was to blame and held that where there is
a conviction of a serious crime, only matters of mitigation and extenuation will be considered by the court. The disciplinary procedures in
such cases are designed to avoid a retrial of the issue of guilt. Despite
some mitigation and extenuation, the court imposed the penalty of
disbarment.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Meyer,76 Mr. Meyer, having
been convicted of serious crimes, was suspended from the practice of
law and the Committee on Professional Responsibility was ordered to
institute the necessary disciplinary proceedings seeking disbarment or
other appropriate remedy. During the past year other reported decisions
reveal the suspension of six attorneys, one apparently by consent" and
five after full-blown disciplinary proceedings. 78 In Fazande the suspension
was for a period of 30 months for the violation of DR 6-101 (A)(3)
(neglecting legal matters entrusted to him), DR 7-101(A)(2) (failing to
carry out contracts of employment), and DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in
misconduct involving misrepresentation). In Schoemann, Mr. Schoemann's conviction of evasion of federal income tax resulted in a one
year suspension. The period of suspension was relatively short because
of convincing evidence of mitigation and extenuation presented by Mr.
Schoemann. In Hopkins, the suspension was also for a period of one
year for failing to remit to a client the funds due her. The court
concluded that a conversion and misuse of funds had occurred but in
view of ultimate payment of the funds to the client and other considerations, the court imposed the relatively mild suspension of one year.
In Wilkins, commingling and conversion of funds also initially resulted
in a penalty of disbarment. However, on rehearing the court deemed a
suspension of three years to be appropriate. Finally, in Martin, failure
to record mortgages and sales netted a six month suspension.
75. 456 So. 2d at 990.
76. 444 So. 2d 1207 (La. 1984).
77. LSBA v. Klein, 449 So. 2d 1025 (La. 1984).
78. LSBA v. Martin, 451 So. 2d 561 (La. 1984); LSBA v. Wilkins, 449 So. 2d 1011
(La. 1984); LSBA v. Hopkins, 447 So. 2d 464 (La. 1984); LSBA v. Schoemann, 444 So.
2d 608 (La. 1984); LSBA v. Fazande, 436 So. 2d 549 (La. 1983).
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In three other cases, public reprimands were imposed. 79 In Cryer,
the attorney had failed to record a bill of sale and, even after being
notified of this failure, did not take any corrective action for two years.
In Porobil, the attorney was convicted as an accessory after the fact
of the crime of furnishing a false financial statement to a bank. The
court found that while the respondent's conduct was not serious enough
to warrant disbarment or a lengthy suspension, the conduct did constitute
a federal crime and that sanctions were necessary to preserve the integrity
and dignity of the profession. In Dowd, the attorney had been charged
with two specifications under both the provisions of Canon 6 and its
associated DR's prohibiting neglect of a client's affairs. It appears from
the opinion that procrastination was the attorney's chief fault under
specification 1 and that permitting a client's suit to prescribe was the
cause of discipline under specification 2. The court concluded that
although Mr. Dowd's procrastination was insufficient to constitute a
violation of DR 6-101(A)(3), permitting his client's suit to prescribe was
sufficient to warrant discipline.
A dispute between two attorneys concerning a division of fees ended
in disciplinary proceedings against one of those attorneys.8 0 After reviewing the entire matter, the supreme court found that a disciplinary
proceeding was inappropriate and that the proper action was a civil
suit. Accordingly, the disciplinary proceedings were dismissed.
In several of the cases cited above, the court reiterated (1) that the
purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not so much to punish the attorney
as it is to maintain appropriate standards of professional conduct in
order to protect the public and the administration of justice and (2)
that the discipline to be imposed in a particular case will depend upon
the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, fashioned in light of
the purpose of lawyer discipline and aggravating or mitigating circumstances.8
MISCELLANEOUS

In the Baton Rouge area, in which the writer practiced for over
twenty years, it was the custom not to default an opposing party when
one was aware that he was represented. When the opposing lawyer
procrastinated in filing pleadings, it was the custom to advise him in
writing that a preliminary default would be taken on a particular day,
and then confirm the default if responsive pleadings were not filed by
then. If an attorney forgot the custom and entered a default or even
confirmed a default, upon being reminded of representation, the attorney
usually agreed to set aside the judgment. Where deliberate action resulted
79. LSBA v.
(La. 1984); LSBA
80. LSBA v.
81. LSBA v.
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in a default judgment, one could usually count on the court setting
aside that judgment upon being advised of the representation and the
prior knowledge of that fact by plaintiff's attorney. Against this background, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Kem Search, Inc. v.
Sheffield8 2 in 1983. The facts presented a very close case. Both the trial
court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that there had been
no fraud or ill practices. The defendant was an attorney who had
communicated with the plaintiff's lawyer on several occasions both orally
and in writing. On one of these occasions, he advised the plaintiff's
lawyer that he intended to use a particular attorney to defend him in
the suit if it became necessary. Prior to confirming the default, plaintiff's
attorney contacted this defense attorney but was advised that Sheffield
had not retained him. Whereupon, plaintiff's lawyer went forward with
the confirmation of default but without notifying Mr. 'Sheffield or
Sheffield's purported attorney that he intended to do so. The supreme
court concluded that under all of the facts and circumstances, enforcement of the judgment would be unconscionable and inequitable, and
set it aside under the provisions of article 2004 of the, Code of Civil
Procedure and the jurisprudence interpreting it. The court pointed out
that, although Sheffield could have more prudently protected his rights
by filing responsive pleadings, he had the not unreasonable impression
that plaintiff's attorney would give him an opportunity to file pleadings
if his settlement overtures were rejected. The court said that the attorney's belief was fully supported by the local court custom, acknowledged
by the trial court, that an attorney should not confirm a default judgment
without prior notice to the opposing attorney. This occurred in the
Baton Rouge area and the writer has been called upon to testify on
occasion concerning that custom. The court did not cite but certainly
could have cited the provisions of DR 7-106(C)(5) which provide that
an attorney in his professonal capacity before a tribunal shall not fail
to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar
or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice
of his intent not to comply. 3 However, the court stated that whether
innocently or otherwise, the Kem Search attorney's confirmation of the
default judgment without giving prior notice constituted ill practice under
the circumstances of the case and entitled Sheffield to have the default
judgment annulled. The court also pointed out that Sheffield had shown
several defenses which would make a substantial difference in the total
amount of the claim.
Several other cases present matters of interest to the practicing
attorney. In Weeden Engineering Corporation v. Hale,8 4 the court held
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that an attorney who engages an expert witness in order to prove his
client's case is personally liable to that expert witness, along with his
client, for the fees and expenses of the witness. It may simply be a
matter of semantics, but while a lawyer is not supposed to obligate
himself directly for the benefit of his client, he may advance or guarantee
the expenses of litigation (including court costs, expenses of investigation,
expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting
evidence) provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses."
Whether the attorney is regarded as primary obligor or surety, the expert
witness is certainly justified in looking to the attorney who hired him
for payment.
In Fredric Hayes, Inc. v. Rollins8 6 a law corporation sued to recover
a contingent fee on a settlement negotiated by the law corporation but
rejected by the client. The court found that since the attorney did not
have authority to settle a client's claim without that client's clear and
express consent, the matter had not been concluded and therefore no
contingent fee was yet due. This was in accord with ethical consideration
7-7 which provides in part that it is for the client to decide whether
he will accept a settlement offer or whether he will waive his right to
plead an affirmative defense.
Scaccia v. Lowe 7 involved the attorney-client privilege and whether
the address of a client, or information concerning his whereabouts, is
protected by that privilege. A divorced husband appealed the dismissal
by summary judgment of his damage suit against his former wife's
attorneys for their refusal to reveal the whereabouts of his minor daughter, who was in the wife's custody. He alleged a conspiracy to defeat
the court's visitation orders by refusal to reveal his former wife's whereabouts. The court found no Louisiana precedent, concluded that authorities in other jurisdictions were divided, and then avoided the issue
by concluding that regardless of whether the privilege applied, the defendant attorneys could not be held liable to the husband in tort. The
court did not go into the distinction between "confidences" and "secrets" as set out in Canon 4. Even though the attorney-client privilege
did not apply, the attorneys ethically could not reveal a secret of their
client to her former husband.
CONCLUSION

Having
appropriate
interesting
concerning
85.
86.
87.

begun this symposium article with conflicts, it is perhaps
to conclude it with a final word on that subject. It is
to notice the difference in the state and federal systems
the procedure of getting the judgment on the motion to
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disqualify to a higher court. In the state courts, almost without fail,
the procedure is an application for supervisory writs. In the federal
system we must first distinguish civil cases from criminal cases. In civil
cases, when the motion to disqualify is granted, it is immediately appealable; ss where the motion to disqualify is denied, it is not immediately
appealable. 9 In criminal cases, where the motion to disqualify is granted,
it is not immediately appealable because it would disrupt the criminal
process. 9° Although no holding on point has been found, presumably
the denial of a motion to disqualify would also not be immediately
appealable. Most attorneys consider a motion to disqualify them a
personal affront; however, it must be realized that there is a time to
fight and a time to retreat. In Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc.,9
the attorneys made a stubborn defense, resisting the disqualification.
The trial court found that their resistance was in bad faith and directed
the attorneys to pay $25,000 to the defendant for resisting the order of
disqualification. This amount covered attorney fees for opposing counsel
and costs. The judgment was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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